• Information Disclosure Makes Simple Mechanisms Competitive
  Yang Cai, Yingkai Li, Jinzhao Wu.

• Incentivizing Forecasters to Learn: Summarized vs. Unrestricted Advice
  Yingkai Li, Jonathan Libgober.

• Mechanism Design under Costly Signaling: the Value of Non-Coordination
  Yingkai Li, Xiaoyun Qiu.

• Simple Mechanisms for Agents with Non-linear Utilities
  Yiding Feng, Jason Hartline, Yingkai Li.

• Managing Persuasion Robustly: The Optimality of Quota Rules
  Dirk Bergemann, Tan Gan, Yingkai Li.
  Revise and Resubmit at Journal of Economic Theory.

• Information Acquisition Towards Unanimous Consent
  Yingkai Li, Boli Xu.

• Budget Pacing in Repeated Auctions: Regret and Efficiency without Convergence
  Jason Gaitonde, Yingkai Li, Bar Light, Brendan Lucier, Aleksandrs Slivkins.
  major revision at Operations Research.

• Exploration and Incentivizing Participation in Clinical Trials
  Yingkai Li, Aleksandrs Slivkins.

• Scale-robust Auctions
  Jason Hartline, Aleck Johnsen, Yingkai Li.

• Mechanism Design with Endogenous Principal Learning
  Daniel Clark, Yingkai Li.

• Dynamics and Contracts for an Agent with Misspecified Beliefs
  Yingkai Li, Argyris Oikonomou.

• Multi-Project Contracts
  Tal Alon, Matteo Castiglioni, Junjie Chen, Tomer Ezra, Yingkai Li, Inbal Talgam-Cohen.

• Competition Complexity in Multi-item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity
  Hedyeh Beyhaghi, Linda Cai, Yiding Feng, Yingkai Li, Matthew Weinberg.

Notes and Dormant Papers

• Misspecified Beliefs about Time Lags
  Yingkai Li, Harry Pei.

• Stochastic Linear Optimization with Adversarial Corruption
  Yingkai Li, Edmund Y. Lou, Liren Shan.

• On Asymptotically Tight Tail Bounds for Sums of Geometric and Exponential Random Variables
  Yaonan Jin, Yingkai Li, Yining Wang, Yuan Zhou.